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1. Introduction 
The large holdings of cash and cash equivalents, that is cash in call deposits and other 
highly liquid assets with a maturity of less than three months, by large listed non-financial 
firms, such as Chrysler in the 1990s or Google and Apple in the 2000s, have been in the focus 
of financial media and economists at least for the past two decades. The question why 
industrial firms hold substantial liquid assets on their balance sheets despite the negligible 
return and the opportunity cost of outstanding liabilities is part of the capital structure puzzle 
(Myers, 1984). Corporate finance theory stresses the transaction and the precautionary motive 
of non-financial firms to hold liquidity (discussed in part 2). According to this view, financial 
market frictions induce firms to hold cash to avoid foregoing future investment opportunities. 
Implicitly, firm investment is of a productive and non-financial nature.  
Contrasting the corporate finance approach with a Kaleckian perspective (in part 3), 
this paper will argue that listed non-financial firms with large cash holdings have a 
speculative demand for liquidity, in the sense, that they utilise financial markets to speculate 
in productive assets. This is reminiscent of Minsky’s (1986) financial instability hypothesis 
where the business cycle is driven by corporate speculation in capital assets. Detailed balance 
sheet analysis of South African non-financial firms (presented in part 4) shows that 
companies with the highest cash ratios—used to identify a high liquidity preference amongst 
non-financial corporations—are either mining companies that speculate in mining exploration 
or long-standing listed companies that engage in active trading of subsidiary companies.   
The paper offers an original contribution to formulating a solution to the capital 
structure puzzle around cash holdings by providing an alternative motivation for corporate 
liquidity demand, examining the capital structure of listed firms in a middle-income country 
and suggesting an alternative liquidity ratio to identify firms likely to hold liquid assets for 
rentier income and out of speculative considerations. 
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2. Cash holdings in corporate finance theory 
In mainstream analysis there are three broad explanatory channels impacting cash 
holdings by non-financial firms: (1) information asymmetries, (2) transaction costs, and (3) 
taxation together with other undesired state intervention. Particularly channel 1 and 2 result in 
a heightened liquidity preference of non-financial firms that are financially constrained, 
meaning they cannot access external finance without experiencing the negative impact of 
these market frictions—mainly in the form of a high external financing premium.  
 (1) Information asymmetries can be interpreted very widely to account for financial friction. 
The assumption is that lack of information reduces perceived firm value1 and collateral, 
making the business more risky for investors. At the core of the asymmetry is the tension 
between firm insiders and their access and knowledge of firm-internal information and 
outsiders and their lack of this information. The relationship is comparable to the relationship 
of managers vis-à-vis the bank and managers vis-à-vis shareholders or absentee firm owners. 
Hence, tied-up with information asymmetries are agency problems and moral hazard. This set 
of problems highlights the differences in interest of firm insiders and outsiders or managers 
and owners. The misalignment of interests can lead to inefficient or wasteful behaviour of 
self-interested managers, reducing firm profit at the expense of some other goal, which is 
beneficial to managers while detrimental to firm profit and value.  
Information asymmetries can be linked to the macroeconomic perspective, invoking 
uncertainty. Uncertainty2 is a generic form of market friction typically regarded to operate at 
the macroeconomic level. Hence, during economic upswings and booms uncertainty would be 
understood to fall while economic downswings and crises go along with increased 
                                                
1 As opposed to actual firm value measured by the benchmark case of a perfectly functioning Arrow-
Debreu-like economy (Arrow & Debreu, 1954).  
2 Uncertainty in Keynes’s sense refers to the impossibility to predict future economic outcomes using 
probability (Keynes, 1936, Davidson, 2009). Risk, in contrast, can be calculated using a probability 
distribution across a range of predefined potential outcomes. Hence, the concept of uncertainty does 
not simply reject perfect foresight but more generally the estimation of economic variables meaning 
risk. Despite a declared allegiance to uncertainty modern mainstream economists often replace true 
uncertainty by probability calculations, that is risk, such as in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models dominant in economic policy advice. Uncertainty is therefore often accounted for by 
increased deviation from average levels, such as increasing variance of monthly GDP (see Baum et al., 
2004, for a cash holdings related example).   
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uncertainty. Consequently, uncertainty exacerbates information asymmetries during 
downswings while alleviating them during economic upswings.  
(2) Transaction costs refer to the observation that assets have different degrees of liquidity 
and can neither be instantaneously nor without cost transformed into other assets. Liquid 
assets and particularly money can be relatively easily exchanged for inventories or fixed 
assets such as machinery whereas the reverse case of transforming machinery into cash 
especially when the firm is under distress to meet payment obligations might prove difficult. 
Therefore, transaction costs are introduced as another market friction preventing corporate 
capital structure from adjusting without cost or delay in the attempt to explain why balance 
sheets of corporations with broadly similar characteristics with respect to size, legal structure 
and so on can differ significantly. Similarly to information asymmetries transaction costs can 
be assumed to increase with rising macroeconomic uncertainty and decrease with its ebbing. 
 (3) Undesired state interventions such as taxation can also introduce a wedge between actual 
corporate capital structure and what would be efficient in a perfectly functioning market à la 
Arrow and Debreu (1954). Hence, firms might enjoy financial gains from debt financing 
because it is tax deductible (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). As consequence, they hold debt in 
excess to what would be optimal in the absence of the tax incentive. There are certain 
limitations complicating this argument as Miller (1977) himself admitted, which explain why 
not all companies take debt up to the maximum.  
Channel 1 alludes to Keynes’s precautionary motive to hold liquidity, while channel 2 
refers to the transaction motive as well as the precautionary motive if it is assumed that 
transaction costs vary with uncertainty depending on overall economic conditions. All three 
categories introduce frictions into the capital market, that is in comparison to the benchmark 
scenario of the Arrow-Debreu perfectly functioning market, corporations do not enjoy 
unconstrained access to financial markets, which can leave them with unseized profitable 
investment opportunities because of lacking finance. Two theoretical frameworks are 
competing to explain the transmission mechanisms of these channels affecting firms’ 
riskiness and value: the static trade-off model and the pecking-order (or financial hierarchy) 
model (Myers, 1984). 
The static trade-off model assumes that all three channels, that is information 
asymmetries, transaction costs and taxation and other undesirable state interventions are 
present and impact corporate capital structure either making cash holdings costly or 
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profitable. Consequently, a cost-benefit calculation will determine the optimal level of cash 
and equivalents to be held. The pecking-order model assumes that information asymmetries 
and transaction costs make external financing expensive, resulting in potentially foregone 
profit if cash reserves are absent in the face of profitable investment opportunities. As 
consequence, corporations prefer to finance internally and only issue securities if necessary, 
starting with the least risky, that is debt, and moving then over hybrid instruments to equity as 
(most risky) last resort (Myer, 1984). Cash holdings will accrue and rise without an optimal 
level limiting accumulation in this framework if the company is profitable and cash flow 
allows for it. 
Practically, the three channels have been widely tested in econometric analysis with 
varying results. There seems to be ambiguity how information asymmetries, transaction costs 
and taxation affect cash holdings and whether it results in lower or higher cash holdings 
compared to some optimal position or some average. Given the competing theoretical 
approaches no consensus has been found on the existence of an optimal level. Table 1 shows 
a selection of results in recent and influential papers on corporate holdings of cash and cash 
equivalents and the apparent motives behind this financing behaviour.  
It is striking that variables such as firm size are found to have a strongly varying effect 
on holdings of cash and cash equivalents, from reducing cash holdings (see Bigelli & 
Sanchez-Vidal, 2011 or Iskandar-Datta & Yonghong, 2011) over increasing them (see Shah, 
2011) to not having any significant impact at all (see Kim et al., 1998). In a sample for almost 
2000 non-financial firms from the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) economies 
covering the years 2002 to 2008, Al-Najjar (2013) found all three effects of firm size on cash 
holdings depending on the country. This example illustrates that isolating individual variables 
in econometric analysis might be difficult since underlying economic and financial structures 
as well as other country specificities are at play. 
The two competing theoretical frameworks seem incompatible with general trends 
identified in cash holdings of non-financial companies in major advanced economies. There is 
evidence that liquidity of corporate balance sheets has increased substantially over the past 
two decades, that is cash and equivalents have grown as share of total company assets (see 
Bates et al., 2009 and Iskandar-Datta & Jia, 2012). Following the logic of the trade-off and 
pecking order models this would imply that financial frictions and constraints in advanced 
economies have also increased. Much of the information asymmetry argument is tied to 
limitations on information dissemination.  
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Table	  1.	  Empirically	  found	  impacts	  on	  cash	  holdings	  by	  non-­‐financial	  firms	  
 
 
Author(s), Year, and Title Economic variables with a positive, negative or 
undetermined impact on cash holdings (+, -, ..) 
Al-Najjar, Basil (2013): The financial 
determinants of corporate cash holdings: 
Evidence from some emerging markets 
Dividend pay-outs (-), leverage (-), profitability (-), size 
(+, -, ..) 
Acharaya, Viral Davydenko, Sergei A. 
and Ilaya A. Strebulaev (2012): Cash 
holdings and credit risk 
Credit spreads (+) 
Iskandar-Datta, Mai E. and Yonghong Jia 
(2012): Cross-country analysis of secular 
cash trends 
Cash flow volatility (+), dividend pay-out (+/-/..), 
investment (-), leverage(-), market-to-book value (+), 
research and development (R&D, +), size (-/..), working 
capital (-) 
Anderson, Ronald W. and Andrew 
Carverhill (2011): Corporate liquidity 
and capital structure 
Long-term average of cash holdings (-), profitability (..) 
Bigelli, Marco and Javier Sanchez-Vidal 
(2011): Cash holdings in private firms 
Cash conversion cycle (+), dividend pay-outs (+), 
financing deficit (-), firm age (-), investment in the 
medium run (+), profitability (+), size (-) 
Dhaliwal, Dan S., Huang, Shawn X. 
Moser, William and Raynoldes Pereira 
(2011): Corporate Tax Avoidance and the 
Level and Valuation of Firm Cash 
Holdings 
Tax avoidance (-) 
Lee, Bong Soo and Jungwon Suh (2011): 
Cash holdings and share purchases: 
International evidence 
Investment (-), equity repurchases (+) 
Shah, Attaullah (2011): The corporate 
cash holdings: Determinants and 
implications 
Cash flow (+), conversion cycle (+), debt maturity (-), 
dividend pay-out (+), market-to-book value (+), size (+) 
Alvarez, Roberto, Sagner, Andres and 
Carla Valdivia (2010): Liquidity crises 
and corporate cash holdings in Chile 
Macroeconomic uncertainty/ liquidity crises (-) 
Bates, Thomas W., Kahle, Kathleen M. 
and René M. Stulz (2009): Why do US 
firms hold so much more cash than they 
used to? 
Agency conflict (..), cash flow volatility (+), R&D (+) 
Harford, Jarrad, Mansi, Sattar A. and 
William F. Maxwell (2008): Corporate 
governance and firm cash holdings in the 
US 
Weak governance (-) 
Baum, Christopher F., Schäfer, Dorothea 
and Oleksandr Talavera (2006): The 
effects of industry-level uncertainty on 
cash holdings: The case of Germany 
Cash holdings in previous year (+), industry uncertainty 
(+), investment (-) 
Khurana, Inder K., Martin, Xiumin and 
Raynolde Pereira (2006): Financial 
development and the cash flow sensitivity 
of cash 
Level of financial development has a (-) effect on changes 
in cash holdings, that is the more developed the financial 
market the less sensitive cash holdings are to changes in 
cash flow. 
Ozkan, Aydin and Neslihan Ozkan 
(2004): Corporate cash holdings: An 
empirical investigation of UK companies 
Bank debt (-), cash flow (+), leverage (-), liquidity of 
other assets (-), market-to-book value (+), strong 
ownership rights (-) implying: agency conflict (+) 
Dittmar, Amy, Mahrt-Smith, Jan and 
Henri Servaes (2003): International 
corporate governance and corporate cash 
holdings 
Protection of shareholder rights (-), this effect is 
strengthened in countries with less developed capital 
markets, implying: financial development (-) 
Almeida, Heitor, Campello, Muriello and 
Michael S. Weisbach (2002): Corporate 
demand for liquidity 
Agency problems (+), financial constraints (+),  
Opler, Tim, Pinkowitz, Lee Stulz, René 
and Rohan Williamson (1999): The 
determinants and implications of 
corporate cash holdings 
Cash flow volatility (+), credit ratings (-), market-to-book 
value (+) 
Kim, Chang-Soo, Mauer, David C. and 
Ann E. Sherman (1998): The 
determinants of corporate liquidity: 
Theory and evidence 
Cash flow volatility (+), cost of external financing (+), 
difference in return on physical and liquid assets (-), 
market-to-book value (+), size (..) 
!
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Surely, technological progress since the early 1990s should have improved companies’ 
possibilities and capacity to address asymmetric information. Transaction costs connected to 
contract enforcement have also been constantly addressed in advanced economies by 
international bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and through bilateral efforts around investment agreements and so on. Finally, with 
respect to undesired government intervention there appears to be broad consensus that the 
decades since the 1980s were characterised by financial deregulation rather than increasing or 
excessive regulation, which would raise financial frictions in the conventional theoretical 
framework. 
There might have been countertendencies at work, such as data issues, referring to the 
expansion and increased integration of smaller firms into the databases typically used for 
corporate financial data. However, Iskandar-Datta & Jia (2012) find that for non-financial 
firms in Australia and Canada median cash and marketable securities as share of total assets 
have more than doubled between 1991 and 2008. The ratio has grown by between 40 per cent 
and 90 per cent in Germany, the UK and the US over the same periods. Bates et al. (2009) 
find that between 1980 and 2006 average cash ratios for US industrial firms have more than 
doubled from cash and cash equivalents accounting for 10.5 per cent of total assets in 1980 to 
23.2 per cent in 2006. Thus, it seems doubtful that data issues alone can account for the 
magnitude of the increase in cash holdings by non-financial firms. 
 
3. Cash holdings in Kaleckian economic theory 
In corporate finance theory, there are two crucial implicit assumptions about firm 
behaviour:  
(1) Non-financial firms finance their investment to a large extent externally, that is through 
bank credit or capital market borrowing. The assumption that firms are the main borrowers in 
the economy, transforming household saving into investment (Mishkin & Eakins, 2006), is 
present in mainstream economics and seems implied by much of Keynesian and Post-
Keynesian theory (Minsky, 1986, Davidson, 1986, Parguez & Seccereccia, 2000). It has been, 
however, shown that after careful analysis of macroeconomic data (Ruggles & Ruggles, 1992) 
companies in aggregate, just like households, finance their investment internally. This 
observation was stressed by Kalecki (1937) in the ‘principle of increasing risk’, stating that 
the cost of external finance increases with the firm’s capital gearing ratio or leverage, 
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meaning the share of debt to own assets. Hence, increasing leverage results in a rising 
external finance premium and combined with the more detrimental effect of investment 
failure dissuades firms from utilising credit or capital market funds to invest in productive 
assets such as equipment and machinery.3  
(2) Investment by firms always refers to productive investment, excluding the possibility that 
non-financial corporations derive significant profit from their financial operations. Through 
financial investment non-financial companies can effectively become rentiers, generating 
profit by financial market operations rather than their productive operations (see Toporowski, 
1993, on the rentier firm). This observation is crucial for economic theory and policy since 
the existence of the rentier firm blurs the lines between financial and non-financial 
companies.4  
The rentier firm holds liquid assets because of two major motivations: the 
precautionary motive and the speculative motive. The nature of economic interaction is that 
all agents can be represented by a balance sheet (Minsky, 1976). The Modigliani-Miller 
theorem—claiming that the true value of a corporation is independent of its capital structure, 
that is the division of its liabilities into debt and equity (Modigliani & Miller, 1958)—and 
corporate finance theory imply that economic entities choose assets and liabilities 
independently of each other. This is not the case since economic entities will attempt to 
balance their liabilities and assets in terms of volume, maturity and liquidity. A more risky 
liability will call for a more liquid asset as counterpart. Liquid assets might even serve to off-
set the volatility in price and value of other assets on the balance sheet. Therefore, listed non-
financial firms, which use stock markets to raise significant external funds, tend to hold on to 
liquid assets in order to avoid a mismatch in assets and liabilities.  
                                                
3It has to be highlighted that within the corporate finance literature the pecking-order model 
acknowledges the lower cost of internal investment financing. Hence, there are significant differences 
amongst individual strands of conventional economics and even within corporate finance theory. 
Thus, this article contrasts corporate finance theory and Kaleckian economics on a general level and 
does not aim at providing a complete comparison, focusing on the elements, which are crucial for the 
hypothesis that non-financial firms use financial markets and instruments for rentier and speculative 
activity.   
4 Financial operations of firms are largely unaccounted for in conventional economic theory. The 
Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem obscured the importance of firms’ financial operations. For 
economic policy, the increased financial nature of corporate investment (of non-financial firms) might 
explain the ineffectiveness of monetary policy to boost private investment in the aftermath of the 
2007-08 financial crisis.   
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The workings behind the latter argument are complex. Equity and total liabilities are 
the counterpart of a listed firm’s total assets on its balance sheet. During economic upswings 
and particularly close to the peak of the business cycle it is easy to obtain equity finance for 
listed firms because of generally optimistic expectations by investors resulting in high asset 
demand and market liquidity. Since share issues are cheaply obtained funds for listed 
companies, as long as they do not lower the share price significantly5, corporations try to take 
advantage of positive sentiment and high market liquidity. Conventional economic theory 
assumes that the raised funds will be channelled into production, either increasing current 
operations or expanding into new products or markets. Increasing current production or 
establishing new operations is fundamentally uncertain from the perspective of supply and 
demand.6 Furthermore, investing during a boom is costly since input prices typically rise as 
result of high demand. Finally—even though companies do not know the exact position of the 
economy within the business cycle—firms are aware of the sudden asset price collapse and 
the sharp reduction in income a recession can generate.     
Therefore, from the perspective of the listed company it makes sense to hold on (at 
least) to (some of) the funds raised by share issuance as liquid assets because these cannot 
lose significantly in value. In contrast, all uncertain investment projects have to be accounted 
for on the balance sheet in a way, that allows for a loss in value.7 If a recession sets in and the 
investment project of the listed company turns out to be a failure the company’s assets 
contract while liabilities may rise. Unfinished investment projects typically influence asset 
positions such as intangible assets or goodwill. These tend to expand during economic 
upswing due to higher perceived profitability and contract during business downturns as 
consequence of failed investment. Concurrently, liabilities might grow if current income is 
not able to meet expenses, resulting in a deficit that accumulates and eats into the firm’s 
equity and reserves. If the combination of contracting assets and increasing liabilities is 
                                                
5 That is as long as there is sufficient demand for newly issued shares in the primary markets. 
6 Questions that might keep manufacturers and other non-financial firm managers up at night are with 
respects to supply: Will the production process adjust easily to higher output volumes? Will the new 
products function as expected?; and with respect to demand: Will demand for existing products 
persist? To what extent does it exist in new markets? Will consumers embrace the new products? 
Which rival products are produced and introduced by competitors? etc. 
7 Marketable securities for example are typically accounted for conservatively allowing for a decline 
in value comparative to actual current price.   
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sufficiently strong to absorb all existing reserves and equity with liabilities exceeding assets 
as result, the firm is bankrupt.   
A decline in asset values and loss of income can affect a firm regardless of the source 
of its investment finance. However, debt has to be repaid and in the extreme case of a debt 
deflation à la Irving Fisher (1933)—when price deflation because of corporate deleveraging 
pushes up real debt—might aggravate the stress on firms’ balance sheets during a recession 
markedly. Equity, in turn, is not repayable but, nonetheless, entails a certain cost for the listed 
firm explaining why it is classified as counterpart to assets in the financial statement. 
Shareholders will demand dividend payments, which is particularly likely to occur when 
share prices are not gaining in value, not allowing investors to sell these shares on lucratively 
(Toporowski, 2000). Hence, retained earnings are the least costly source of finance. In any 
case, firms might hold cash and cash equivalents out of precautionary reasons to balance the 
risk of a decline in asset values and a fall in income induced by individual investment failure 
or systemic recession. 
The precautionary and the speculative motive are closely related. Obtaining cheap 
funding by listed firms from rising equity markets might result in a re-investment of these 
funds into the very same markets. This dynamic can be described as capital market inflation 
(Toporowski, 2000), stressing that periods of speculation in equity markets are not deviations 
from some stable equilibrium but the norm based on prevailing price dynamics where rising 
price attracts ever increasing demand while falling price results in ever stronger withdrawal of 
the same. Holding precautionary liquid assets non-listed firms will, nevertheless, strive to 
maximise their return from these assets. Highly liquid assets with little risk, such as call 
deposits with banks, typically yield marginal income. Listed companies—due to the sheer 
volume of assets they possess—have significant negotiation power to obtain a somewhat 
higher return on liquid assets held in deposits with banks and other financial institutions.  
Nonetheless, it seems the more significant profits can be made by speculative 
purchases of marketable securities—such as controlling and non-controlling shares in other 
companies. In this way, listed companies contribute to and benefit from capital market 
inflation since they pour additional liquidity into equity markets further increasing share 
prices, in order to benefit from the price rise at a later stage through a profitable sale. Because 
large non-financial listed companies buy smaller non-financial listed (or non-listed) 
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companies to speculate8, the transaction per se appears like a productive investment. This 
appearance is even stronger since large corporations typically purchase shares in companies 
that operate in the same or related industries. In fact, some listed companies speculate in 
equity of non-financial firms using financial markets. Such a situation is described by Minsky 
(1986) in his financial instability hypothesis (FIH) where firms’ speculation in capital 
investment is the driving force behind the business cycle.9 
Firms using financial operations for rentier income or speculative purposes are likely 
to be overcapitalised. The concept of overcapitalisation (and related to that excess capital10) 
can be found in accounting. It refers to the situation where a firm cannot pay the adequate 
dividends on its issued shares. It is a consequence of over-issuance (‘watering down’) of 
equity given profits or of insufficient profits given the amount of shares.11 Practically, this 
might mean that a firm issued capital in order to obtain liquid funds, which generate low 
income, instead of financing investment, which would generate higher income if successful. 
The adequate level of dividend payments is generally hard to define but low and persistently 
falling dividends as well as high liquidity ratios are regarded to be an indicator of 
overcapitalisation. Within economics the concept of overcapitalisation has been mentioned in 
work on financial economics since the beginnings of the past century (see Hilferding, 1910 
and Lenin, 1948) as well as in Kaleckian economic theory (see Steindl, 1945). Within the 
theory of capital market inflation it is clearly defined as the act of non-financial corporations 
holding liabilities that exceed the value of their productive assets including their ‘plant, 
                                                
8 Less frequently, small listed firms acquire large listed companies, which has a reverse listing as 
consequence. This means the smaller company is in fact absorbed into the bigger one. 
9 Crucially, Minsky assumed that firms would finance this speculation through bank lending. In most 
advanced economies—with the notable exception of Japan—large listed companies do not heavily 
rely on bank lending or debt to finance their speculative investment but mainly on equity, since this is 
a cheaper way of external finance. Debt has to be repaid upon maturity, while equity is issued by the 
corporation against a fee to the financial institutions involved but without the obligation of the former 
to repay the obtained funds. Instead investors obtain profit from equity investment in secondary 
markets when they manage to resell at a high price (Toporowski, 2000). Therefore, it is questionable 
to what extend firms run up debt in the course of the business upswing, which then triggers and 
aggravates the subsequent recession.  
10 The concept of excess capital bears certain similarities. It is typically found on the balance sheets of 
financial corporations and refers to capital, which is held beyond reserve requirements. In that sense it 
is regarded to be wasteful (just as in the case of over-capitalisation) because it could be more 
profitably invested in less liquid assets. 
11 Sometimes overcapitalisation also refers to the excessive acquisition of fixed capital. The term is not 
referred to in this sense in the present article.  
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equipment, materials and stocks of unsold products and semi-fabricates’ (Toporowski, 2008: 
p. 4).    
The argument here is that non-financial firms utilise financial markets such as the 
capital market to finance their speculation in financial and non-financial assets. A symptom of 
this behaviour is the overcapitalisation of non-financial firms. Therefore, the assumptions by 
conventional economic theory that listed firms amass liquid assets to seize future investment 
opportunities might be correct. However, these investment opportunities do not have to be of 
a productive nature. The fact that large listed non-financial firms engage in managing their 
liquidity actively on their balance sheet appears to be a reflection of financial market 
inefficiency. Non-financial companies deem it beneficial to build up financial management 
expertise in-house instead of leaving this to financial markets and specialised financial service 
providers. 
 
4. Cash holdings in practice 
This section will support the hypothesis that non-financial corporations might utilise 
liquid assets to generate rentier income and speculative profit, analysing operations of cash-
rich JSE-listed corporations. If non-financial firms are overcapitalised in that they engage in 
financial operations to acquire rentier income and/or speculate, this will show up in a 
heightened liquidity preference. Therefore, a specific overcapitalisation ratio (OCR) will be 
introduced to operationalize the presented concept of firm overcapitalisation. Subsequently, 
the financial statements of JSE-listed firms will be examined for signs of excess cash holdings 
by economic sector and finally on a case-by-case basis. This section will show that almost one 
third (28%) of all non-financial firms listed at the JSE between 1970 and 2012 engage in cash 
management—measured by the cash ratio—comparable to that of financial corporations. 
Furthermore, the ten firms with the highest volumes of cash and cash equivalents compared to 
total current liabilities speculate in non-financial assets and received rentier income with one 
company (Village Main Reef Limited) operating as pure rentier firm for more than one 
decade. 
4.1. Financial ratio analysis    
Financial ratios are simple but meaningful mathematical representations of a 
company’s measurable activity. The cash ratio is the best commonly used liquidity ratio that 
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could serve as proxy to measure overcapitalisation of firms.12 It expresses cash and cash 
equivalents as share of current liabilities. Cash is currency on hand and demand deposits with 
banks and other institutions. Cash equivalents are short-term, highly-liquid investments that 
are readily convertible to known amounts of cash, meaning that there is insignificant risk of 
change in value due to a change in the interest rate. Short-term refers to a time period of three 
months or less (European Commission, 2003, Deloitte, 2011). The concept of 
overcapitalisation identifies firms that hold substantial liquid assets not for operating, 
investing or financing of their core business activities, meaning production or service 
provision in the case of non-financial firms, but rather for cash management and financial 
investment.  
Therefore, strictly speaking the cash ratio does not capture overcapitalisation fully, 
since it does not contain liquid assets and investments, which are undertaken for longer than 
three months. These are often referred to as short-term investment or marketable securities, 
classified as financial investment either under current or non-current assets. It is important to 
include these investments to avoid understating the full extent of a firm’s overcapitalisation. 
Mining companies typically possess mine rehabilitation funds accumulated over time to 
address the decontamination of land once mining activity ceases because further resource 
extraction is (commercially) not viable. These funds are often highly liquid and they provide 
rentier income, meaning profit generated purely from financial transactions, to the non-
financial corporation.  
Hence, to measure the true extent of overcapitalisation an overcapitalisation ratio 
(OCR) has to be constructed, which reveals assets that are held to generate rentier income 
and/or for speculative profit. The distinction between positions, which are held for 
operational, investment or financing purposes and those accumulated to simply obtain rentier 
                                                
12 Other liquidity ratios conventionally used include the current ratio and the quick ratio. The current 
ratio measured as current assets to current liabilities is not suitable for the purposes of the analysis it 
expresses total current assets, including inventories, account receivables, cash and cash equivalents as 
well as other current assets as share of total current liabilities. Stressing the impact of the business 
cycle on companies’ financial positions it has to be acknowledged that inventories and receivables 
might in fact turn into illiquid assets in the course of an economic downswing. The quick ratio 
excludes inventories, expressing current assets less inventories as share of total current liabilities. 
However, account receivables, which are mostly trade credit among firms—clients and suppliers—and 
sometimes between firms and households might similarly become effectively non-performing loans. 
This means that debtors cannot pay their commitments because they are also facing declining demand 
for their products, experiencing a reduction in or complete absence of income. Hence, recognising that 
firms’ (and households’) balance sheets are interlinked and assets are simultaneously liabilities it is 
difficult to classify inventories and receivables as liquid assets.   
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profits and/or speculative gains, is not clear-cut. Especially, since it is generally accepted that 
non-financial companies are in need of liquid assets to address short-falls in cash flow during 
re-occurring business cycle downswing. Convention suggests a cash ratio of around 20% for 
non-financial firms as advisable (Wöltje, 2012).  
Nevertheless, even for a very conservative non-financial company holding liquid 
assets beyond the volume of current liabilities cannot be justified by the precautionary motive 
because holding liquid assets companies not only forgo potential income from production but 
also hold off on paying back their liabilities. Therefore, an OCR could relate cash and cash 
equivalents but also marketable securities and other financial assets—all assets that 
potentially generate rentier income—to total current liabilities13. Thus, two financial ratios are 
suggested to analyse sectoral and individual balance sheets, namely the cash ratio and the 
OCR: 
 
(1) Cash ratio = !"#!  !"#  !"#!  !"#$%&'!"#$!"#$%  !"##$%&  !"#$"!"%"&'  
 
(2) OCR = !"#!  !"#  !"#!  !"#$%&'!()*!!"##$%&  !"#$#%"$&  !""#$"!!"!!!"##$%&  !"#$#%"$&  !""#$"!"#$%  !"##$%&  !"#$"!"%!"#  
 
The cash ratio is a valid proxy for the OCR and will be considered since it is a 
conventional financial ratio utilised by accountants and other practitioners. Its comparison to 
the OCR will reveal how much overcapitalisation is concealed through the balance sheet 
structure and presentation of financial results. Both ratios can be used to establish a threshold 
for the overcapitalisation of non-financial firms, namely the 100% mark. Firms holding liquid 
financial assets in excess of their current liabilities reveal that their cash and financial assets 
management is not driven by precautionary motives.   
                                                
13 Even though the denominator refers to current liabilities—and therefore the numerator should 
strictly speaking consist of current assets—non-current assets that potentially generate rentier income 
or speculative gains and are therefore held out of rentier or speculative reasons can equally be 
subsumed into this ratio. The example of financial investment held in rehabilitation funds by mining 
companies is a case in point. The combination of current and non-current balance sheet position in the 
OCR is justified since given some penalty payment non-current financial assets could also be sold to 
address income shortfalls. The proposed ratio will not account for the penalty because large-listed 
companies are typically in a position to negotiate very favourable terms for their financial investment. 
Furthermore, the position other (current or non-current) assets often masks further financial 
investment, which cannot be accounted for despite close screening of financial statements and annual 
reports. 
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4.2. JSE-listed companies 
In the following, the cash and overcapitalisation ratios for listed South African 
companies are examined. The analysis starts at a sectoral level, proceeding to the firm level. 
Reviewing liquidity ratios for South African firms the McGregorBFA database is used. The 
database provides data for 429 non-financial firms listed at the JSE between 1970 and 2013.14 
As of April 2013, there were 370 listed firms on the JSE with a market capitalisation of 7.8 
trillion R (ShareDate, 2013), while South African gross domestic product (GDP) amounted to 
around 3 trillion R in 2012 (National Treasury, 2013). Table 2 shows cash ratios by sector and 
decade.  
Because detailed annual reports and firm-level balance sheet analysis is required to 
calculate the suggest OCR, the sectoral examination focuses on cash ratios. Three thresholds 
can be highlighted:  
(1) Conventionally, the cash ratio should be around 20% (Wöltje, 2012). Cash ratios of 
20% and up to 49% are marked in yellow, signalling potential overcapitalisation. 
Yellow highlights have to be treated with caution, however, since only ratios 
significantly larger than 20% would be out of line with convention. Hence, the 20% 
threshold for overcapitalisation is a weak measure.  
(2) All cash ratios of 50% and up to 99% are shown in orange. This threshold is taken 
from the sub-sector analysis. Financial companies listed on the JSE with the highest 
cash (and cash equivalents) holdings in relation to current liabilities have cash ratios 
of around 50% in aggregate and on average for the period 1970 to 2012 (see table 2). 
These are companies dealing with financial investment that is equity and non-equity 
instruments such as currencies and real estate. The 50% threshold is important since at 
this point the distinction between financial and non-financial firms with respect to 
their cash management as measured by the cash ratios is blurred. These non-financial 
firms are overcapitalised. 
(3) Finally, the 100% mark is applied as third threshold to identify strongly 
overcapitalised companies because even a very cautious non-financial firm can only 
hold up to 100% of its current liabilities in cash and cash equivalents under a 
precautionary motive. Anything beyond 100% must be differently motivated.  
                                                
14 Supplementary online research (Who owns whom?, Share Date) reveals that there are at least 22 
companies, which were listed at the JSE in the past. All of these firms have been delisted from the JSE 
and some have been taken over through mergers and acquisitions. 
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Table	  2.	  Overcapitalisation	  ratios	  by	  sector	  and	  by	  decade,	  1970-­‐201215	  
Source:	  McGregorBFA	  database	  and	  author’s	  own	  calculations,	  2013.	  
	  
Moving on to the application of these thresholds to economic sectors in aggregate, 
basic materials have to be considered by sub-sector due to data availability. Particularly in 
industrial metals as well as diamond and gemstone mining there has been a tendency for cash 
ratios to rise over time.  Interestingly, the general mining sub-sector has experienced a strong 
increase in its aggregate cash ratio during the politically uncertain decade of the 1980s before 
the end of the Apartheid regime. The ratio almost tripled during that time in comparison to the 
                                                
15 The suggested periodization is broadly based on socio-economic events, acknowledging that some 
variability in this exercise is possible. While the Apartheid government was internationally strongly 
criticised during the 1960s and 1970s, it only came under severe political and economic strain during 
the 1980s. Thus, the arms embargo by the UN Security Council against the Apartheid regime only 
became mandatory in 1977 as reaction to the Soweto Uprising in 1976. In 1986, the US Congress 
passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act imposing sanctions and demanding the release of 
Nelson Mandela. Therefore, the decade before the end of Apartheid (1980-1993) can be seen as 
distinct period. Equally, the post-Apartheid years during the 1990s (1994-1999) are treated as one 
period, coinciding with the presidency of Nelson Mandela and his attempt to reconcile the country. 
The early 2000s (2000-2007) were characterised by an economic upswing around the world and high 
and sustained GDP growth in South Africa of 4.4% annually on average (SARB, 2013). Subsequently, 
the repercussions of the global financial crisis combined with slowing domestic growth plunged South 
Africa into recession by the final quarter of 2008. Since, the country has experienced a recovery and 
moderate growth. 
Sub$Sector 1970$1979 1980$1993 1994$1999 2000$2007 2008 2009$2012 Average
Basic9materials
Forestry9&9Paper 11.0% 10.7% 21.2% 24.4% 14.2% 20.7% 15.9%
Industrial9Metals 7.7% 22.9% 39.3% 41.8% 66.9% 36.9% 28.0%
Chemicals 15.7% 2.8% 11.0% 21.2% 9.1% 18.0% 11.9%
Mining
Coal 13.0% 26.8% 51.3% 9.0% 0.8% 41.0% 25.2%
Diamond9&9Gemstones n/a 34.8% 38.0% 99.1% 15.3% 16.3% 48.6%
General9Mining 24.6% 72.7% 52.4% 22.0% 24.2% 43.5% 45.9%
Platinum9&9Precious9Metals 12.2% 33.5% 34.5% 18.1% 23.9% 18.9% 24.5%
Gold 3.4% 4.3% 25.6% 24.7% 12.7% 43.3% 14.7%
Consumer9Goods 3.9% 9.0% 19.0% 26.3% 19.5% 19.8% 13.9%
Consumer9Services 8.3% 13.0% 27.1% 31.1% 25.9% 23.0% 18.7%
Finance
Banks n/a 10.5% 4.4% 7.2% 3.0% 3.2% 7.4%
Financial9Services 30.0% 44.4% 18.6% 14.4% 9.2% 8.8% 27.7%
Insurance 0.1% 19.6% 77.1% 26.8% 10.5% 9.4% 23.8%
Investment9Instruments 3.6% 59.3% 67.8% 96.2% 23.4% 29.2% 51.9%
Real9Estate 17.0% 103.3% 97.6% 30.2% 13.9% 9.7% 59.0%
Health9Care n/a 82.4% 3.9% 28.5% 19.7% 29.0% 37.1%
Industrials 10.1% 16.3% 20.8% 21.5% 323.1% 27.3% 24.6%
Oil9&9Gas n/a 22.3% 51.5% 16.6% 13.1% 41.9% 28.3%
Technology 0.7% 8.9% 54.0% 45.1% 36.4% 34.3% 23.5%
Telecommunication 127.5% 37.7% 28.5% 17.5% 35.6% 32.2% 40.9%
Utilities n/a n/a 20.5% 69.3% 2.4% 18.8% 44.9%
Note:9Cash9ratios9of920%$49%9are9marked9in9yellow.
Cash9ratios9of950%$99%9are9marked9in9orange.
Cash9ratios9of9100%9and9more9are9marked9in9red.
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average in the 1970s. This is in line with a potential precautionary motive to hold cash and 
cash equivalents as share of current liabilities. Furthermore, given the embargoes against 
South African firms cash holdings might have been virtually trapped within South Africa, 
while political instability discouraged domestic investment. During the subsequent decades 
the aggregate cash ratio for general mining companies listed at the JSE in aggregate declined 
to just above 20%, which is in line with convention.   
Apart from mining companies the other economic sectors that exhibited high levels of 
cash holdings outside of crises (that is 2008) or periods of structural change (that is 1994-
1999 as result of South Africa’s re-integration in the world economy) are: 
telecommunications in the 1970s, health care during the 1980s and utilities in the early 2000s. 
All sectors have been subject to the rising trend in cash ratios. The increase was mostly 
gradual with the exception of the technology sector. Here, the end of Apartheid appears to 
have resulted in a sharp rise of companies’ cash holdings as share of total current liabilities.16 
For the other sectors, however, it could be argued that the re-integration of the South African 
economy into the world market has simply accelerated a trend (towards the emergence of high 
cash ratios), which was already under way (see table 2). 
For all 429 firms cash ratios are calculated for all years provided between 1970 and 
2012. Applying the overcapitalisation threshold of 20%, 50% and 100% it can be shown that 
almost 60% of all firms—namely 251 out of 429—in this sub-set are at least weakly 
overcapitalised (see table 3). Abstracting from the weak 20% threshold, approximately one 
third (28%) of companies in this sub-set would either be overcapitalised (50% threshold) or 
strongly overcapitalised (100% threshold). More than half of the strongly overcapitalised 
firms (54%) are basic materials producers, the majority amongst them—29 out of 36—mining 
companies. Amongst the top ten of these ranked by cash ratio only two companies are not 
basic materials producers—namely Allied Electronics Corporation and Mine Restoration 
Investments. Of the eight remaining corporations six are mining companies (see table 4). 
 
 
                                                
16 This is not surprising since foreign investment is likely to have targeted the technology sector first 
given South Africa’s previous isolation from the world market and its consequent distance from the 
global technological frontier. The increase of foreign influence on JSE-listed technology companies 
might have resulted in taking over liquidity management preferences (towards high cash holdings as 
share of total current liabilities) prevalent in investors’ home markets such as the US and the UK. 
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Table	  3.	  Number	  of	  overcapitalised	  South	  African	  firms	  by	  sector,	  1970-­‐2012	  
 
Source:	  McGregorBFA	  database	  and	  author’s	  own	  calculations,	  2013.	  
	  
Table	  4.	  The	  top	  10	  strongly	  overcapitalised	  firms	  listed	  at	  the	  JSE	  ranked	  by	  cash	  ratio	  
	  
Source:	  McGregorBFA,	  2013,	  Who	  owns	  whom?,	  2013.	  
	  
To understand the motivations behind holding such large cash levels in comparison to 
current liabilities the top 10 of the strongly overcapitalised non-financial corporations listed in 
table 4 have to be analysed in detail, using their annual reports and other supplementary 
sources. Detailed annual reports can be obtained for most companies in this sample, going 
back to the 1990s. The only exception is Gazankulu Gold Holdings whose JSE listing was 
suspended in September 1995. There is no information available about the company neither 
through McGregorBFA nor the other financial data providers17.  Table 5 provides company 
profiles for the remaining nine of the top 10 strongly overcapitalised JSE listed firms. 
 
 
 
                                                
17 This refers to Who owns whom? and ShareData. The company does not possess an online presence 
either. 
Overcapitalisation.ratio.of
Sector >20% >50% >100% Total
Basic.materials 28 12 36 135
Consumer.goods 8 5 1 43
Consumer.services 28 11 5 70
Health.care 4 1 1 11
Industrials 48 11 13 117
Oil.&.gas 1 1 1 4
Technology 9 12 9 39
Telecommunications 3 1 1 8
Utilities 0 1 0 2
Total 129 55 67
Firm Sector Status Period Average 1970s 198071993 199471999 200072007 2008 200972012
GAZ=7=Gazankulu=Gold=Holdings=Ltd Gold%mining Suspended%19952Sep 198821994 16892.0% 19705.7% 9.5%
CMO=7=Chrometco=Limited Non2gold%mining 200622012 10347.3% 83.7% 989.4% 17818.6%
WGR=7=Witwatersrand=Cons=Gold=Resources Gold%mining 200622011 1785.7% 2690.2% 1437.4% 1298.9%
VIL=7=Village=Main=Reef=Limited Gold%mining 197122012 1163.2% 32.5% 19.9% 0.0% 4783.2% 9675.0% 86.0%
KWR=7=Kiwara=Plc Industrial%metals Delisted%20102Feb 200822009 981.8% 1341.2% 622.4%
ATN=7=Allied=Electronics=Corporation=Ltd Industrials 197122012 875.3% 3893.6% 101.5% 18.0% 7.3% 32.3% 24.9%
KBO=7=Kibo=Mining=Plc Non2gold%mining 2011 867.6% 867.6%
AEA=7=African=Eagle=Resources=Plc Industrial%metals 200822011 855.3% 1007.4% 804.6%
CZA=7=Coal=Of=Africa=Limited Non2gold%mining 200722012 849.5% 553.1% 3666.6% 219.4%
MRI=7=Mine=Restoration=Investments=Ltd Industrials 2012 790.5% 790.5%
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Table	  5.	  Top	  10	  strongly	  overcapitalised	  firms	  listed	  at	  the	  JSE:	  company	  profiles	  
	  
Source:	  Companies’	  annual	  reports,	  1995-­‐2012,	  ShareData,	  2013.	  	  
Name
Activity
Incorporation/.listing
Comments
Activity
Income.sources
Market.capitalisation.
(April.2013)
Activity
Incorporation/.listing
Income.sources
Market.capitalisation.
(April.2013)
Village)Main)Reef)Limited Activity Until&1995:&recovery&of&gold&from&sand&dumps
(Village) 199592010:&closure&activities
Incorporation/.listing Incorporated&in&South&Africa&in&1934,&listed&at&the&JSE&in&1944
Income.sources
Market.capitalisation.
(April.2013)
Kiwara)Plc Activity Base&metal&exploration
(Kiwara) Incorporation/.listing
Secondary&listing&at&the&JSE&in&April&2008.
Income.sources
Comments
JSE&listing&suspended&in&September&1995
Primary&listing&at&the&London&Stock&Exchange&(AIM)
No&operating&income,&limited&interest&on&liquid&assets,&
financing&through&equity&issuance
In&2009&Kiwara&had&difficulties&raising&capital,&the&
International&Financial&Corporation&of&the&World&Bank&Group&
agreed&to&purchase&shares&for&cash&worth&6&million&US&dollar&
(option&on&further&9&million&US&dollar).&In&2010&First&New&
Quantum&bought&Kiwara,&delisting&from&the&JSE&in&February.&
Witwatersrand)
Consolidated)Gold)
Resources)(Wits)Gold)
Gold&and&uranium&exploration
338&million&Rand&(rank&257&out&of&370&listed&companies)
Incorporated&in&South&Africa&in&December&2002,&listed&at&the&
JSE&in&April&2006,&secondary&listing&at&the&Toronto&Stock&
Exchange&in&January&2008.
Gold&exploration&but&not&mining&itself,&implying&the&main&
income&sources&ate&sales/management&of&mines.&
Since&2010:&after&the&reverse&takeover&of&Simmer& &Jack's&
Gold&Mines&activities&are&gold,&platinum&and&other&mineral&
mining
Incorporation/.listing
No&further&information&available&
Incorporated&in&South&Africa&in&October&2002,&listed&at&the&
JSE&AltX&in&August&2005
41&million&Rand&(rank&348&out&of&370&listed&companies)
Until&1995:&gold&mining,&199592010:&income&from&asset&sales&
and&limited&interest&on&liquid&assets,&since&2010:&mining&
operations
777&million&Rand&(rank&221&out&of&370&listed&companies)
Gazankulu)Gold)Holdings)
Ltd)(Gazankulu)
Company)profile
Gold&mining
The&company&has&been&concentrating&on&mining&exploration&
until&2011&when&mining&operations&at&Rooderand&Chrome&
began.&Main&income&sources&have&been&financial&income&
(since&2008&when&interest&rates&on&liquid&assets&were&
changed&from&0%&to&a&variable&rate)&and&sales/management&
of&mines.
Copper,&cobalt,&manganese&and&iron&ore&exploration&and&
mining
Chrometco)Limited)
(Chrometco)
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Name
Activity
(Altron)
Incorporation/.listing
Income.sources
Comments
Market.capitalisation.
(April.2013)
Kibo0Mining0Plc Activity
(Kibo) Incorporation/.listing
Income.sources
Market.capitalisation.
(April.2013)
African0Eagle0Resources Activity Mineral(exploration
Incorporation/.listing
Income.sources
Market.capitalisation.
(April.2013)
Coal0of0Africa0Resources Activity Coal(exploration(and(mining
(Coal0of0Africa) Incorporation/.listing
Income.sources
Market.capitalisation.
(April.2013)
Activity
Incorporation/.listing
(MRI)
Income.sources
Comments
Market.capitalisation.
(April.2013)
Allied0Electronics0
Corporation0Ltd
Investment(holding(company(with(principal(listed(
subsidiaries(in:(professional(electronics,(
telecommunications,(power(electrical(and(electrical(
appliances,(and(information(technology(industries
Forerunner(company((Allied(Electric)(is(incorporated(in(
South(Africa(in(1965.(Allied(Technologies((Altech)(is(listed(at(
the(JSE(in(1975.
Apart(from(regular(operations(Altron(is(very(active(in(
acquisitions(and(disposals(of(subsidiary(firms.(Financial(
income(was(10%(of(total(income(until(2003.
Altron(makes(a(conscious(effort(to(bring(in(BEE(partners(R(
important(as(government(tenders(are(sought.(Until(2003(
accounting(practice(illustrated(that(inRhouse(financial(
services(amounted(to(a(substantial(share(in(group(assets((ca.(
10R30%)(and(operating(income((ca.(10%).(Altron(securitised(
the(entire(portfolio(of(Fintech,(engaged(in(the(financing(and(
administration(of(leasing(office(equipment(which(the(group(
itself(is(producing.(Fintech(was(sold(in(2006.((
Mine0Restoration0
Investments0Ltd
Water(treatment(technology
Established(by(a(reverse(take(over(of(Western(Utilities(
Corporation(by(Capricorn(Investment(Holdings(in(2012
No(operating(income(yet,(income(from(dividends(and(
interest.
155(million(Rand((ranked(296(out(of(370(listed(companies)
Incorporated(in(the(UK(in(1996.(Primary(listing(at(the(London(
Stock(Exchange((AIM),(secondary(listing(at(the(JSE((AltX)(in(
August(2007.
Acquisition(and(disposal(of(subsidiary(companies/mines,(no(
income(from(mining(operations,(financed(through(equity(
issuance.
187(million(Rand((ranked(284(out(of(370(listed(companies)(
Incorporated(in(1979(in(Australia.(Primary(listing(at(the(
Australian(Stock(Exchange(in(1980,(secondary(listing(at(the(
London(Stock(Exchang((AIM)(in(2005,(secondary(listing(at(the(
JSE(in(November(2006.
Since(2007(Coal(of(Africa(has(been(making(losses(on(
operations,(financed(through(equity(issuance,(current(and(
nonRcurrent(liabilities.(Also(very(active(in(acquisition(and(
disposal(of(subsidiary(firms.
Capricorn(Investment(Holdings(was(listed(as(financial(
company(on(the(JSE.(At(the(point(of(reverse(acquisition(
Capricorn(was(merely(a(cash(shell,(not(possessing(any(
business(operations.(The(acquisition(of(Western(Utilities(
Coporation(was(financed(by(equity(issuance.
94(million(Rand((ranked(317(out(of(370(listed(companies)
Company0profile
1,898(million(Rand((ranked(174(out(of(370(listed(companies)
7,107(million(Rand((ranked(110(out(of(370(listed(companies)
Gold(and(nickel(exploration
Incorporated(in(Ireland(in(2008.(Primary(listing(at(the(
London(Stock(Exchange((AIM)(since(2010,(secondary(listing(
at(the(JSE(in(May(2011.
No(operating(income,(limited(current(liabilities,(no(nonR
current(liabilities,(financed(through(equity(issuance.
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It is striking that five of the top ten strongly overcapitalised firms—namely 
Chrometco, Wits Gold, Kiwara, Kibo and African Eagle Resources—are emerging mining 
exploration companies. These corporations do not have significant income from actual mining 
activity rather they focus on exploring depots of precious and industrial metals and potential 
mines. Their profits are generated through the purchase, sale and management of mines 
and/or mining rights. These profits therefore depend crucially on the development of 
international mineral prices. In this sense, their activity is highly speculative, exposed to 
exploration risk as admitted by these companies themselves: ‘Mineral exploration is highly 
speculative due to a number of significant risks, including the possible failure to discover 
mineral deposits that are sufficient in quantity and quality to justify the completion of pre-
feasibility or feasibility studies’ (Witwatersrand Consolidated Gold Resources, 2007: p. 21).   
An illustrative example of this risk is Chrometco’s gamble over their Rooderand 
Chrome subsidiary. Rooderand Chrome was acquired in 2006 for a 600 000 Rand cash 
payment and a share issue worth 2 million Rand to be bought back by Chrometco a year later 
(Chrometco, 2007). In 2007, it was sold to the Austrian company Deco Metal for 62 million 
Rand, resulting in a profit of more than 50 million Rand after some minor investment 
expenditure in the mining site. Since the sale of Rooderand Chrome was conditional on the 
renewal of mining rights and Chrometco shareholders’ approval a management agreement 
was put into place according to which Deco Metal could start exploiting the mine for an 
annual payment of 13 million Rand. The management contract was valid for five years (until 
2011) at which point the mine would go over into Deco Metal’s possession if all sales 
conditions were met (Chrometco, 2008). Chrometco shareholders decided against a sale of the 
asset, which was valued at 181 million Rand and worth up to 257 million Rand in 2011 
(Chrometco, 2011). Hence, shareholders assumed the exploitation of the asset by Chrometco 
directly would yield larger profits than the intended sale, while the management contract had 
provided for sufficient income to partially cover losses from Chrometco’s (non-mining) 
operations. After re-acquisition of the asset the project suffered a setback in 2012 because 
international chrome prices declined severely making large-scale mining of chrome at 
Rooderand not economical (Chrometco, 2012). Nevertheless, mining has started in 2012 and 
future development of the chrome price will decide about its profitability.  
Hence, financed by capital markets—namely through equity issuance—Chrometco 
was able to acquire a mining asset in the attempt to make a speculative profit, selling it on 
after a value gain. The fact that Chrometco finally decided against this option and for 
investment into actual mining operations, exemplifies the close connection between 
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speculative and productive activity. In general, these emergent mining companies appear to be 
holding cash and cash equivalents well in excess of their current liabilities with hardly or no 
non-current liabilities on their books in order to finance speculative subsidiary acquisition 
quickly and to avoid illiquidity given the lack of regular cash flow from operations. They 
effectively sidestep financial intermediaries, suggesting that these might not be perceived to 
channel scares financial resources into the most profitable undertakings while financial 
markets in general—such as the capital market—are used to acquire funds for speculation.        
Amongst the strongly overcapitalised listed firms there are also long-standing mining 
companies such as Village and Coal of Africa. Village and MRI, an industrial company 
focusing on water treatment technology, share certain similarities. Both have been cash 
shells—that is entities with significant liquid funds but without any business operations—
until recently, explaining their high cash ratios. While MRI developed out of a financial 
corporation explaining the absence of productive activity, Village was a pure rentier firm 
between 1995 and 2010. Its income from productive operations ceased with cash flow entirely 
generated by financial assets and fixed asset sales.  
Village is one of the older South African gold mining companies—incorporated in 
1934—which, however, had to cease gold extraction in 1995 due to its non-profitability, 
concentrating on the winding down of operations. Its substantial liquid assets—cash and cash 
equivalents as well as funds invested into a mine rehabilitation fund—allowed the company to 
survive for another 15 years without actual mining operations. More importantly, it helped 
Village to raise sufficient equity for a reverse takeover of Simmer & Jack’s Gold Mines in 
2011. Similarly, Mine Restoration Investments grew out of the reverse takeover of Western 
Utilities Corporation by Capricorn Investment Holdings in 2012. The latter was set up in 1996 
as financial services group with interests in banking, insurance and asset management. Both 
examples show the close interconnectedness of productive and financial capital, illustrating 
the fluid transition from one to the other, which is characteristic for the rentier firm.  
Coal of Africa is a long-standing Australian mining company, listed in Australia as 
well as the UK and only recently (in 2006) also listed at the JSE. Traditionally, a 
manufacturer and distributor of nickel and magnesium alloys the company refocused on coal 
exploration and extraction in South Africa as major business in 2008. Most likely due to this 
reorientation, operating income has been negative since 2007 and had to be financed via 
equity issuance as well as short-term and long-term debt. Also, the firm is particularly active 
in acquisitions and disposals of subsidiary firms which are likely to generate income and 
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might also be motivated by speculative value gains. The characteristic of active trading in 
subsidiary companies Coal of Africa shares with Altron, the only well-established industrial 
company amongst the top ten of overcapitalised firms (see table 6). 
Table 6. Altron’s acquisitions and disposals of subsidiaries 
 
Year Acquisitions Disposals
1996 Alcatel'Alsthom'Compagnie'Générale'd'Électricité'SA:'157.9'million'R'in'
cash'(profit'of'2.2'million'R)
1997 40%'interest'in'ABB'Powertech'Transmission'and'
Distribution'(Pty)'Limited
General'Technologies'Trading'Limited:'7'million'R;'rest'of'General'
Technologies'Limited
1998 Voltex'Holdings'Limited:'100%'of'cable'manufacturing,'
25%'of'distribution'business'for'1'billion'R;'100%'interest'
in'Sabat'Battery'Company
1999 n/a n/a
2000 n/a n/a
2001 n/a n/a
2002 Repurchase'of'9.3%'of'Altron'shares 29%'interest'in'Voltex'Group:'140'million'R
2003 Repurchase'of'minority'shareholder'interest'in'Powertech'
subsidiary:'437'million'R;'100%'interest'in'Plato'Computer'
Services:'22.5'million'GBP;'100%'interest'in'NamlTech:'
526'million'R
40%'interest'in'Altech'Alcatel'Telecoms:'335'million'R
2004 50%'plus'one'vote'interest'in'Xerox'South'Africa:'235'
million'R'
25.01%'interest'in'Altech'Data'to'BEE'partner;'27'%'interest'in'Bytes'SA'
to'BEE'partner:'228'million'R;'30%'interest'in'Aberdare'Cables'to'BEE'
partner:'165'million'R;'30%'interest'in'Alcom'Systems
2005 50%'plus'one'vote'interest'in'AEW;'100%'interest'in'CS'
Holdings:'45'million'R;'60.97%'interest'in'Digital'Health'
Solutions
28%'interest'in'NamlTech'to'BEE'partner
2006 Calidus'Von'Roll'Isola:'32'million'R;'100%'interest'in'
MobiMaster;'100%'interest'in'Xclusive'Solutions:'45'
million'GBP
33%'interest'in'Fintech;'50%'plus'one'vote'interest'in'Econet'Wireless'
Global:'87.5'million'USD
2007 50%'interest'in'Altech'Netstar'franchisee'in'Malaysia;'
100%'interest'in'Swani'Cables:'100%'interest'in'Vantage'
Business'Systems;'repurchase'of'Altron'participating'
preference'shares:'77'million'R;'repurchase'of'1.27%'of'
Bytes'subsidiary'ordinary'shares:'25.2'million'R
25%'interest'in'Altech'Netstar'to'BEE'partner
2008 Electrical'and'mechanical'engeneering'businesses'(excl.'
defence'and'nuclear'devisions)'of'IST'Group'Limited:'550'
million'R;'0.82%'of'Bytes'subsidiary'ordinary'shares:'21.9'
million'R;'42.3%'of'Bytes'subsidiary'shares'acquired'
against'Altron'shares'(delisting'of'Bytes);'3.71%'of'Altech'
subsidiary'shares:'186.5'million'R;'25%'interest'in'Cables'
de'Comunicaciones'Zaragoza:'7.6'million'EUR;'100%'
interest'in'ComTech:'72.4'million'R;'51%'interest'in'Kenya'
Data'Networks'Limited,'Swift'Global'(Kenya)'and'Infocom'
Limited:'75'million'USD;'50%'interest'in'ABB'Powertech'
Transformers:'320'million'R'
2009 100%'interest'in'Intelleca:'115'million'R;'100%'interest'in'
NOR'Paper:'164'million'R;'100%'interest'in'Fleetcall:'40'
million'R;'100%'interest'in'Technology'Concepts:'7.5'
million'R
100%'interest'in'Yelland'Control:'75'million'R;'22%'interest'in'Bytes'SA'
to'BEE'partner:'198'million'R;'Altech'NamITech's'SA'operations:'82'
million'R
2010 9.8%'interest'in'Kenya'Data'Networks:'3.3'million'USD;'
50%'plus'one'vote'interest'in'NuPay:'53.5'million'R
2011 100%'of'Swift'technology'Solutions:'52'million'R;'25%'
plus'one'vote'interest'in'Altech'Information'Technologies'
reacquired'from'BEE'partner:'37.5'million'R
25.1%'interest'in'Altech'Netstar's'SA'to'BEE'partner;'25%'plus'one'vote'
interest'in'Altech'Alcom'Matomo,'Altech'Alcom'Radio'Distributors'and'
Altech'Fleetcall'to'BEE'partner
2012 100%'interest'in'Securities'Partnership'Limited'and'
HealthOne:'96'million'R;'100%'interest'in'Eyenza'Mobile'
Money'Limited:'4'million'R;'80%'interest'in'SetOne'
GmbH:'4'million'EUR;''100%'interest'in'Unisys'Africa'
Limited:'77'million'R
50.1%'interest'in'Battery'Technologies,'Rentech'and'Willard'Industrial'
Division:'75'million'R
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Altron is a typical industrial conglomerate, operating in the electronics and electrical 
appliances, telecommunications and information technology industries. The case of Altron is 
interesting because it demonstrates that non-financial corporations at the core of productive 
industries such as electronics and technology also derive substantial income from their 
financial operations. Because of the complex structures of conglomerates this is often difficult 
to show. Altron’s annual reports show that financial income amounted to 10% on average 
between 2000 and 2003, while operating assets of in-house financing operations were around 
22% (Allied Electronics Corporation, 2000-2003). The fact that financial assets in total 
operating assets declined significantly in 2004 (to 7% from 11% and 30% in 2003 and 2002, 
respectively) when the reporting standard was changed excluding cash and cash equivalents 
from segmental assets, suggests that in-house financial operations focused on liquidity 
management. 
Altron also utilises advanced financing techniques to support demand for its products. 
In 2003, the entire balance sheet of Fintech18, a subsidiary which was financing and 
administrating leasing contracts between Altron subsidiaries and corporate as well as 
government clients. This means Altron incorporated financing operations for its clients into 
its business structure, similar to large US companies like General Motors, providing finance 
for purchases and leasing contracts of its automobiles. Once, again this finding appears to 
suggest that a non-financial company does not trust established financial intermediaries to 
provide adequate credit to prospective customers, and instead acquires financing capabilities 
itself. This is a sign of financial market inefficiency. In this sense, Altron uses financial 
markets to support demand for its own products and as table 6 shows to finance purchases and 
sales of subsidiary companies. Hence, Altron is the Minskyan archetype non-financial 
company speculating in productive investment, using external finance. 
Concluding the analysis, table 7 demonstrates that the suggested OCR can be helpful 
to identify overcapitalisation among non-financial firms with complex balance sheets such as 
Altron. It compares the cash ratio—which can be interpreted as conventional alternative to the 
OCR—and the OCR. Generally, the ratios do not differ substantially for the nine companies 
in the sample, for which data are available. Only in the cases of Altron, Village and Coal of 
Africa is the OCR markedly higher than the cash ratio. According to the latter Altron would 
merely be weakly overcapitalised, which is not a reliable indication of overcapitalisation. 
                                                
18 Worth 680 million Rand (Allied Electronic Corporation, 2004).  
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Table	  7.	  Top	  10	  overcapitalised	  firms	  listed	  at	  the	  JSE:	  cash	  ratios	  and	  OCRs	  
Source: McGregorBFA and firms’ annual reports, various years.  
 
All three companies are well-established listed corporations with a complex balance 
sheet structure, suggesting that overcapitalisation can be easily masked by a sophisticated 
capital structure. This also means that corporations well familiar with the capital markets 
because of their long-standing listing are likely to use a wider range of liquid assets. The 
finding suggests that with the transformation of emerging listed companies into more mature 
ones their liquidity management becomes more complex, shifting away from cash and cash 
equivalents into marketable securities—meaning the speculation in productive capital—and 
other short-term investment.     
     
Conclusion 
Apart from their transaction and precautionary motives to hold liquid assets—stressed 
by corporate finance theory—non-financial firms have a speculative demand for liquidity. 
This paper illustrates this demand for a sample of 10 JSE listed firms with the highest average 
cash ratios over the years 1970 to 2012. Detailed balance sheet analysis for these companies 
reveals that they speculate in productive assets—reminiscent of Minsky’s FIH—using 
external financing. Furthermore, they generate significant financial income effectively turning 
into rentier firms.  
 
 
 
Year
Cash%ratio OCR Cash%ratio OCR Cash%ratio OCR Cash%ratio OCR Cash%ratio OCR Cash%ratio OCR Cash%ratio OCR Cash%ratio OCR Cash%ratio OCR
2012 202.7% 202.7% n/a n/a 5.6% 59.6% n/a n/a 19.0% 64.0% 867.6% 512.0% n/a 605.0% 15.9% 36.3% 790.5% 790.5%
2011 69737.0% 69737.0% 1699.0% 2236.8% 27.0% 79.1% n/a n/a 25.5% 65.5% n/a 325.7% 593.5% 634.3% 19.3% 42.0% n/a 4493.0%
2010 437.4% 437.4% 1249.4% 1256.6% 213.0% 78.4% n/a n/a 23.0% 77.1% n/a 678.4% 800.8% 885.8% 94.9% 131.4% n/a n/a
2009 897.5% 897.5% 948.1% 951.5% 98.3% 1501.0% 622.4% 624.0% 32.4% 76.7% n/a 29.3% 1019.5% 1020.3% 747.4% 1169.5% n/a n/a
2008 989.4% 989.4% 1437.4% 1590.7% 9675.0% 33525.0% 1341.2% 1343.6% 32.3% 54.5% n/a n/a 1007.4% 1007.3% 3666.6% 4151.3% n/a n/a
2007 18.2% 18.2% 1969.5% 2618.7% 31925.0% 117900.0% n/a 528.1% 30.5% 49.0% n/a n/a n/a 1797.7% 553.1% 670.1% n/a n/a
2006 149.3% 149.3% 3410.8% 3426.2% 1122.1% 3063.8% n/a n/a 28.2% 37.7% n/a n/a n/a 1395.4% n/a 19.8% n/a n/a
2005 n/a 249.3% n/a 939.2% 1035.2% 1242.1% n/a n/a 0.0% 49.8% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
2004 n/a n/a n/a n/a 1157.2% 1365.1% n/a n/a 0.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
2003 n/a n/a n/a n/a 1089.2% 1293.7% n/a n/a 0.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
2002 n/a n/a n/a n/a 1013.6% 1236.1% n/a n/a 0.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
2001 n/a n/a n/a n/a 923.0% 1156.0% n/a n/a 0.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
2000 n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.0% 1121.5% n/a n/a 0.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1999 n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.0% 1033.6% n/a n/a 0.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1998 n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.0% 909.6% n/a n/a 0.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1997 n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.0% 692.2% n/a n/a 42.4% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1996 n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.0% 184.2% n/a n/a 14.9% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1995 n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.0% 153.9% n/a n/a 14.2% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1994 n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.0% 90.9% n/a n/a 36.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Kibo%Mining%Plc African%Eagle%
Resources%Plc
Coal%Of%Africa%Limited Mine%Restoration%
Investments%Ltd
Chrometco%Limited Witwatersrand%
Consolidated%Gold%
Resources
Village%Main%Reef%Limited Kiwara%Plc Allied%Electronics%
Corporation%Ltd
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